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Abstract—Bitcoin has created a new exchange paradigm within
which financial transactions can be trusted without an interme-
diary. This premise of a free decentralized transactional network
however requires, in its current implementation, unrestricted
access to the ledger for peer-based transaction verification. A
number of studies have shown that, in this pseudonymous context,
identities can be leaked based on transaction features or off-
network information. In this work, we analyze the information
revealed by the pattern of transactions in the neighborhood of
a given entity transaction. By definition, these features which
pertain to an extended network are not directly controllable
by the entity, but might enable leakage of information about
transacting entities. We define a number of new features relevant
to entity characterization on the Bitcoin Blockchain and study
their efficacy in practice. We show that even a weak attacker
with shallow data mining knowledge is able to leverage these
features to characterize the entity properties.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, Privacy, Pattern classification, Bipartite
graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [18] stands out as the first global decentralized cur-
rency, and has seen spectacular growth recently, as illustrated
by the exponential shape of the value of a transaction fee over
the year 2017, see Figure 1. The underlying Bitcoin data struc-
Figure 1. Transaction fee in USD: over the year 2017.
ture, the Blockchain, has been perceived as a catalyst to the
emergence of broad decentralized applications, from crypto-
currency exchanges, to decentralized autonomous organiza-
tions (DAO), or tokens, see [1] for a comprehensive review.
However, one of the most compelling applications remains the
promise of a global decentralized currency, supporting large
portions of the global economy.
A. Emergence of a decentralized global currency
As presented in [13], after only a few years, the bitcoin
network has emerged to reflect a complex global payment
system with new forms of players representing the traditional
actors of the established financial infrastructure. Global trans-
actions between Bitcoin exchanges, illustrated in Figure 2,
have drastically complexified in the last 5 years. It is important
for regulatory purposes as well as for the development of new
crypto-currency paradigms to understand Bitcoin anonymity
properties. Indeed, a healthy economy requires application of
the rule of law on financial transactions [6], which usually
entails traceability and transparency on identities. On the other
hand, in order to attract users, privacy considerations associ-
ated with crypto-currency have to be adequate and competitive
with privacy properties of transactions using fiat money.
We say that a transaction medium is private if no infor-
mation on the transacting entity is revealed by the transaction
graph. In the Bitcoin context, each individual transaction is
publicly associated with a pseudonymous identity. Hence the
strongest possibly guarantee is that the set of transactions
associated with a given pseudonymous identity does not reveal
information about the hidden transacting entity.
The main contribution of this work is the illustration that
patterns of transactions involving the transacting entity but
also patterns of neighboring transactions (on the transaction
graph) are characteristic of the entity, in that these patterns can
be turned into a fingerprint of transacting entity classes. We
further give evidence that using these neighboring transaction
patterns allows reaching state-of-the-art entity classification
results.
B. Related work
Because the Bitcoin transaction graph is completely public it
is clear that Bitcoin flows can be traced, although this is limited
by merging transactions [24]. Recent analysis of ransomware
attacks and associated bitcoin transactions can be found in [9],
[16], [21].
Furthermore, joining Bitcoin transaction with off-network
activities can contribute to linking identities of certain Bitcoin
transactions [23], for instance the authors of [10] link Bitcoin
users with Tor hidden services.
A number of studies are focused on the problem of address
clustering consisting of identifying the address set associated
with a transacting entity, and typically rely on heuristics
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Figure 2. Bitcoin exchanges transactions: for the month of March 2013
(top) and March 2018 (bottom). The width of the edge is proportional to the
total value of transactions during the month for the associated exchange pair
(the size of the nodes is arbitrary).
motivated by properties of the Bitcoin Blockchain protocol,
such as the requirement of a unique signature for transaction
inputs, see for instance [4], [14] and references therein for
more details. The authors of [8] highlight that these methods
crucially depend on address re-use behavior.
Another attack motivated by the Bitcoin protocol involves
the inference of peer-to-peer communication structure [5] and
information leakage from the message dissemination pattern.
A different type of attack is presented in [20], where the
authors show that statistical analysis of bloom filters could
help to identify the set of addresses owned by Bitcoin wallets.
It has also been shown that patterns of newly minted bitcoins
could play a role in revealing information of certain Bitcoin
users [15].
Thematically closer to our work, several studies have con-
sidered the extent to which data mining methods can be ap-
plied to the entity characterization problem, with for instance
the use of transaction-specific features in [26], able to achieve
70% accuracy for classifying entities into several types. In
[22], the authors introduce the notion of transaction motifs
with application to the detection of bitcoin exchanges, and
achieve greater than 80% accuracy.
C. Contributions of this work
Motivated by the success of [22], we consider the more
general problem of classifying entities into multiple classes,
based on extended transaction neighborhood properties. The
study of transaction graph neighborhood structure is promising
for at least two reasons.
First, the use of graph network features has been shown to
be efficient for graph learning problems [27]. The promise of
such methods is illustrated by the spread of graph databases
and related applications [25]. The authors of [19] for example
are able to successfully re-identify nodes from a noisy graph
structure provided as part of a Kaggle contest.
Second, if neighboring network transactions are confirmed
to be informative of entity identities, they constitute a fun-
damental limit to Bitcoin privacy guarantees. Indeed, while
an individual has control of his personal address usage and
transaction patterns, he does not have control of the behavior
of the entities he is transacting with. While services such as
CoinJoin serve to limit information leakage of Bitcoin flows
via the merging of individual transactions [17], there is at this
stage no service providing full neighborhood obfuscation.
The main contribution of this work are the following:
• definition of novel features for entity classification from
a graph neighborhood perspective,
• analysis of the performance of various classification
methods,
• discussion of the implications of these entity characteri-
zation results in the context of Bitcoin anonymity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II we define
the graph model we propose for the Bitcoin Blockchain. In
Section III, we present our classification models as well as
details of the graph neighborhood features developed. Finally
we provide in Section IV numerical results that demonstrate
the effectiveness of entity characterization using actual Bitcoin
Blockchain data. Section V provides concluding remarks.
II. BLOCKCHAIN GRAPH MODEL
The Bitcoin Blockchain is a succession of blocks B. Each
block b ∈ B contains a set of transactions T (b) = {ti}i ⊂
T . We first present a bipartite address-transaction graph
model, and then explain how we derive a discrete-time entity-
transaction graph model with features relevant to the entity
characterization program.
A. Address-transaction graph
We model the Bitcoin Blockchain as a directed weighted
bipartite graph H = (A ,T ,L ), where a ∈ A represents
an address, t ∈ T represents a transaction between addresses,
and l ∈ L represents an edge between an address and a
transaction. We partition the edge set into edges incoming
to a transaction, and edges outgoing from a transaction, as
follows: l ∈ L = I ∪ O , where I stands for input edges,
i.e. incoming edges of a vertex t, and O for output edges, i.e.
outgoing edges of a vertex t. Multiple edges can exist between
a pair (a, t) ∈ A ×T .
For each transaction t ∈ T , we define I(t) ⊂ I and
O(t) ⊂ O as the corresponding edges between the transaction
and the addresses associated. For each i ∈ I (resp. o ∈ O),
we uniquely define the associated transaction t(i) (resp. t(o))
and address a(i) (resp. a(o)); these are well defined because
the graph is bipartite.
We ignore the address and transaction fields that are specific
to the protocol or not relevant to our study, see for instance [2]
for related graph models for permissioned blockchains, or [3]
for a more fundamental analysis of a transaction graph model
and inherited protocol properties. In this work, we consider
the following vertex and edge properties:
• edge: inputs, I , (resp. outputs, O) are represented by
their amount in BTC, v(i) for i ∈ I (v(o) for o ∈ O),
sent (resp. received) by an address, a(i) (resp. a(o)), for
a given transaction, t(i) (resp. t(o)),
• transaction vertex: a transaction contained in a block b(t)
has a fee, f(t), and a time τ(t), corresponding to the time
when the block it belongs to is validated, τ(t) = τ(b(t)).
• address vertex: an address has a creation date and a
balance.
In the next section we explain how we derive the entity-
transaction graph from the address-transaction graph.
B. Entity-transaction graph
In the Bitcoin Blockchain a user may employ several
addresses. We therefore introduce the concept of an “entity”
where entity, e, is fully characterized by a set of addresses
A(e) = {a(e)i }i, which can be interpreted as a logical user. We
discuss subsequently the various methods for defining these
sets, such as the common spending heuristic.
The entity-transaction graph is a directed weighted bipartite
graph G = (E ,Te,Le) of entities and associated transactions.
Let e ∈ E denote an entity and t ∈ Te, a transaction between
entities. Entities and transactions are connected by edges l ∈
Le = Ie ∪ Oe, where Ie stands for input edges, and Oe
represents output edges.
As with addresses, for each transaction t ∈ Te we define
Ie(t) ⊂ Ie and Oe(t) ⊂ Oe as the corresponding edges
between the transactions and entities. For each i ∈ Ie (resp.
o ∈ Oe), as for the address-transaction graph, we uniquely
define the associated transaction t(i) (resp. t(o)) and entity
e(i) (resp. e(o)). Inputs, Ie, (resp. outputs, Oe) represent the
amount in BTC, v(i) for i ∈ Ie (v(o) for o ∈ Oe), sent
(resp. received) by an entity, e(i) (resp. e(o)), for a given
transaction. We define the set of addresses, A(Ie(t)) (resp.
A(Oe(t))), associated with a set of inputs (resp. outputs).
The mechanism to build the entity-transaction graph from the
address-transaction graph is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Entity graph: (right) is obtained by aggregation of the address
graph (left).
The vertices and edges of the entity-transaction graph inherit
the properties of the address-transaction graph by standard
summation of continuous properties and aggregation of graph
topology. Additionally we consider that vertices and edges of
the entity-transaction graph inherit some statistics of the entity-
transaction graph that are lost by summation (e.g. an entity
graph edge inherits the count of address graph edges which it
subsumes).
We further define a set of categories c ∈ C , corresponding
to entity class labels. We shall consider in the remainder of this
work the entity classification problem, namely identification of
the class label c ∈ C associated with an entity e ∈ E , based
on the address-transaction graph.
C. Discrete time graph
We apply temporal aggregation to the directed weighted
bipartite graph of entities G = (E ,Te,Le) to obtain a
discrete-time data structure with commensurate properties.
Definition 1 (Discrete-time operator). A discrete-time aggre-
gation operator is an operator :
∆(τ1,τ2) : G 7→ G (τ1,τ2)
where time-aggregated entities and transactions
E (τ1,τ2),T
(τ1,τ2)
e are derived from E ,Te,Le and required to
satisfy the following constraints:
• Entity activity: only entities transacting during the time
period are considered. E (τ1,τ2) = {e ∈ E ,∃t ∈
Te, τ(t) ∈ [τ1, τ2] ∧ ((e, t) ∈ Ie(t) ∨ (t, e) ∈ Oe(t))}
• Transaction: the edges, (ei, ej) ∈ T (τ1,τ2)e , represent the
aggregation of transactions between two entities within
the time window, {t ∈ Te, τ(t) ∈ [τ1, τ2] ∧ e(Ie(t)) =
ei ∧ ∃o ∈ Oe(t), e(o) = ej}.
In the following, we work with the discrete-time graph
G (τ1,τ2) = (E (τ1,τ2),T
(τ1,τ2)
e ) obtained by applying the
discrete-time operator, with typical discrete time intervals of
a day, a week, or a month.
D. Motifs
The notion of motif in the Bitcoin Blockchain was in-
troduced in [22] as a useful concept in entity classification
studies, specifically in the context of Exchange detection. The
authors define the so-called 2-motif. In this work, we consider
more generally the case of N-motif and present a few relevant
special cases.
Definition 2 (1-motif). A 1-motif is a path of length 2 on the
entity-transaction graph, (e1, t, e2) ∈ E ×Te × E , in G .
motif1(t) = {(ei, t, ej)}i,j .
If e1 = e2 we call it a Loop 1-motif, otherwise it is called
Distinct 1-motif.
The 1-motif, is a direct transaction between entities. More
generally, a direct N-motif is a path of length 2N in the
directed weighted bipartite graph starting and ending with an
entity.
Definition 3 (Direct N-motif). A N-motif is a path of length
2N , (e1, t1, . . . , tN , eN+1) ∈ E × Te × · · · × Te × E , in G
starting and ending with an entity. A motifN (t1, . . . , tN ) =
{(ei1 , t1, . . . , tN , eiN+1)} is required to satisfy the following
constraint:
• Direct: at least one output from each transaction is an in-
put to the next transaction. ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N −1}∃(o, i) ∈
O(tk)× I(tk+1), a(o) = a(i).
If e1 = eN+1 we call it a Direct Loop, otherwise Direct
Distinct. From this condition we deduce immediately that
the transactions are ordered in time: τ(t1) < · · · < τ(tN ).
Considering only Direct N-motif avoids redundancy of explo-
ration and focuses on fast flow of value. In this work, we do
not consider non-Direct paths that would correspond to more
complex transfer-and-hold patterns.
We illustrate the case of a 3-motif in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. 3-motif: consisting of a path of length 6 on the bipartite entity-
transaction graph.
Statistics of 1,2, and 3-motifs over the dataset considered
are presented in Table I, with the following entity categories:
Exchange, Gambling, Mining, Service, Darknet, as per la-
belling from Wallet Explorer. An indication of the power
of transaction graph neighborhood structure is that certain
motifs dominate within certain entity categories, e.g. direct
transactions with distinct entities are more characteristic of
Exchanges than of other entity categories.
Motif attributes such as BTC volume and number of ad-
dresses are similarly inherited from the address-transaction
network, by summation and aggregation.
III. ENTITY CLASSIFICATION
In this section we present the methods used for inferring
the category associated with each entity, using our graph
neighborhood features on the Bitcoin transaction graph. We
first recall the heuristics used for associating distinct addresses
to a single entity.
A. Common spending heuristic for address clustering
The common spending heuristic consists of clustering ad-
dresses that are inputs to the same transaction with the same
entity. Formally,
Hypothesis 1 (Common Spending).
∀t ∈ T , ∃!e ∈ E , ∀i ∈ I(t), a(i) ∈ A(e)
The common spending heuristic is equivalent to the assump-
tion that having access to multiple private keys at a given
point in time is a defining property of an entity. Indeed, in
order to submit a transaction T to the Blockchain protocol,
the transaction must be signed, implying using the private key
of each address in the input set of the transaction, see Figure 5.
a1
a2
a3
T a(e1)2
a
(e1)
1
a
(e1)
3
T
Figure 5. Common Spending Heuristic: all addresses input to a transaction
are associated with the same entity.
The notion of transitive closure allows extending the set of
addresses associated with a given entity.
Hypothesis 2 (Transitive Closure).
∃(t1, t2) ∈ T 2, s.t.{a1, a2} = A(I(t1)), {a1, a3} = A(I(t2))
=⇒ ∃!e, {a1, a2, a3} ⊂ A(e)
Under Hypotheses 1, 2, each transaction only has one input
entity: ∀t ∈ Te, |Ie(t)| = 1. In the following section we
present the types of features used for entity classification.
B. Features
We wish to demonstrate the effectiveness of graph neighbor-
hood features for entity characterization. As such we propose
the following five feature classes:
• Address features involving only address properties,
• Entity features that can be computed from the set of
addresses associated with a given entity,
• Temporal features related to the evolution of specific
transaction properties,
• Centrality features encoding the value of classical cen-
trality measures [7],
• Motif features corresponding to transaction paths involv-
ing the entity of interest.
The remainder of this section provides more details on each
set of features.
Address-specific features include attributes such as the
total BTC received, the total BTC balance, the number of
Table I
MOTIF DISTRIBUTION: 1-MOTIF DISTINCT IS INDICATIVE OF EXCHANGES (64.6% OF SUCH MOTIFS CORRESPOND TO EXCHANGES). ON THE OTHER
HAND 3-MOTIF DIRECT LOOP IS INDICATIVE OF SERVICES (63.0% OF SUCH MOTIFS CORRESPOND TO SERVICES).
Type Sub-type Quantity Exchange Gambling Mining Service Darknet
1-motif Loop 16.085.493 26.3% 25.7% 4.9% 39.6% 3.5%
1-motif Distinct 5.390.310 64.6% 1.1% 2.7% 30.3% 1.2%
2-motif Direct Loop 10.196.844 21.1% 28.1% 0.1% 48.5% 2.1%
2-motif Direct Distinct 20.469.285 46.9% 6.3% 3.7% 38.7% 4.4%
3-motif Direct Loop 30.914.975 24.6% 11.5% 0.1% 63.0% 0.9%
3-motif Direct Distinct 85.822.858 54.0% 4.4% 3.6% 34.1% 3.9%
input/output transactions, the number of predecessor/successor
addresses, unique and otherwise, the number of predecessors
addresses that are also successors, and the number of sibling
addresses in output.
Analogous features are defined at the entity level as well as
the number and proportion of coinbase transactions.
1-motif features include the value of incoming/outgoing
transactions in BTC and USD, the number of incom-
ing/outgoing addresses, the number of incoming/outgoing
transactions per day, their total value in BTC and USD, and
their total fee.
2-motif and 3-motif features are analogous but include also
particularities of this graph structure such as, for 2-motif,
the number of inputs (resp. outputs) in the first (resp. sec-
ond) transaction of an incoming/outgoing/loop motif, the total
value of the inputs (resp. outputs) of the first (resp. second)
transaction of an incoming/outgoing/loop motif in BTC and
USD, as well as the number of incoming/outgoing/loop motifs,
the number of addresses involved as center of an incom-
ing/outgoing/loop motif, the value transferred in the middle
and the fees of the transactions in BTC and USD, and the
number of predecessors/successors for an incoming/outgoing
motif. 2-motif features are illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. 2-motif features (rectangular white boxes) annotated over a 2-
motif, including both edge features and vertex features over transaction paths.
Centrality-based features include measures of betweenness
centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality, in-degree
centrality, out-degree centrality, PageRank, and load centrality.
These features are computed on the discrete-time aggregation
of the entity graph over a week, a month and a year.
Temporal features are those such as the number of weeks,
months, years of activity, the number of entity traded with per
week, month, year, the number of receiving, sending days, the
activity period duration, and the active day ratio.
We make use of in total 10 address features, 8 entity
features, 16 temporal features, 42 centrality features, 44 1-
motif features, 81 2-motif features, and 114 3-motif features.
Remark. For each continuous feature such as volume of
Bitcoin transactions, we calculate the mean and the standard
deviation in order to allow the classifier to discriminate up to
second order statistics.
Transaction values are considered both in terms of BTC and
USD, in order to support the analysis over the multiple years
over which the BTC value in USD changed.
C. Classification method
Given our interest in understanding the behavioral features
characterizing certain categories of Bitcoin users, we propose
to use a decision tree method, which provides feature relevance
statistics via bootstrapping. A decision tree hm(x) partitions
the feature space into Jm disjoint regions R1m, . . . , RJmm and
produces a constant value in each region. The output of hm(x)
for input x can be written as the sum:
hm(x) =
Jm∑
j=1
bjm1Rjm(x)
where bjm is the model response for input features from
region Rjm. We consider an ensemble of trees, which we learn
sequentially by minimizing the weighted sum
Fm(x) = Fm−1(x) + γmhm(x),
γm = argmin
γ
n∑
i=1
L(yi, Fm−1(xi) + γhm(xi)).
according to a gradient boosting procedure, where L(·) is the
loss function.
In order to identify the ensemble tree hyper-parameters most
suited to our problem, we approximate the performance of
the tree ensemble for given parameter values using Gaussian
Processes. We learn a surrogate fˆ(·) of the loss function f(·)
based on previous evaluations {(θ1, f(θ1)), . . . , (θk, f(θk)},
and identify the parameter minimizing this surrogate function.
The calibration procedure can be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1. For t ∈ {1, . . . , T}:
• Given observations {(θi, f(θi)),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , t}}, we
build a surrogate fˆt using Gaussian processes. Each value
f(θi) is the loss function value obtained after having
trained a decision tree with the hyper-parameter θi.
• Given the surrogate function fˆt, we identify the parameter
θt+1 providing a good compromise between minimizing
the surrogate fˆt and exploring the parameter space. The
evaluation of the surrogate function for a parameter
value consists in running the gradient boosting routine
described above.
We benchmark the result of our decision tree algorithm
against a logistic regression algorithm, defined below:
∀xi ∈ E , fˆentity(xi) = yi = argmax
c∈C
fc(xi)
where
fc(X) = P(Y = c|X) = h((XΦ)Tβc), h(t) = e
t
1 + et
.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present our experimental results, as
well as implications of these results for Bitcoin transaction
anonymity.
A. Blockchain dataset
We consider the set of blocks of height inferior or equal to
514.971, corresponding to blocks created before March 24th
2018, 15:19:02, which contains about 500.000.000 addresses.
Address labels are obtained from WalletExplorer1.
We apply the common spending heuristic and transitive clo-
sure operation described in Section III-A to the labeled dataset
obtained from WalletExplorer, and extend it slightly. We
interact with the Bockchain via the BlockSci toolbox v.0.4.5
released on March 16th 2018 [11], on a 64 GB machine. The
final labeled dataset used in numerical experiments consists of
30.331.700 addresses, associated with |Eknown| = 272 entities
representing 5 entity categories in the following proportions:
• Exchange: 108 entities, 7.892.587 addresses.
• Service: 68 entities, 17.606.608 addresses.
• Gambling: 65 entities, 2.775.810 addresses.
• Mining Pool: 19 entities, 78.488 addresses.
• DarkNet Marketplace: 12 entities, 1.978.207 addresses.
While the set of labeled address is of significant size, it is
important to observe the entity category class imbalance, with
the dominant Service class representing more than 50% of the
dataset, and the smallest Mining Pool category representing
less than 0.5% of the dataset.
B. Model calibration procedure
The decision tree model described in Section III-C is
deployed in Python via the LightGBM implementation [12].
The Gaussian Process-based optimization procedure for hyper-
parameter optimization is implemented using the Python skopt
library2 with initial parameter values obtained from a coarse
random search.
We use a typical 70/30 training/test partition of our dataset.
The learning rate hyper-parameter of the decision tree model
is optimized over the interval [0.01, 0.5] after having done
a random search over [0, 2]; the resulting value is 0.18. To
train LightGBM, we use an early stopping procedure which
stops the training if the log loss does not decrease over ten
1https://www.walletexplorer.com/
2https://scikit-optimize.github.io/
consecutive iterations. The procedure stops after 61 iterations
with a loss of 0.35.
The inverse of the L2 regularization parameter of the logistic
regression model is optimized over the interval [0.01, 3] after
having done a random search over [0, 5]; the value obtained
is 0.55.
The Gaussian Processes procedure is used with 50 iterations,
which is a reasonable compromise between a small computa-
tion time, less than one hour for LightGBM in our hardware
setting, and a good exploration of the interval. For fairness
we use the same criterion for the logistic regression model.
Along the same lines, we only optimize one hyper-parameter
for LightGBM, namely the learning rate.
C. Feature importance
We analyze the performance of the classification model
first from the perspective of an unsophisticated attacker in-
crementally adding features to a generic model based on
their ease of access. We then model a sophisticated attacker
with extensive modeling knowledge, collecting the full set of
features, calibrating model hyper-parameters, and identifying
the minimal set of relevant features required for a successful
attack.
1) Weak attacker: Consider an attacker who collects fea-
tures in the following order, from simplest to most complex:
• Address features requiring access only to the address set,
• Entity features requiring access to the address set and
address clustering heuristics,
• Temporal features,
• Centrality features requiring crawling the Blockchain
transaction network for connectivity information,
• 1,2,3-motif features: requiring crawling the Blockchain
transaction network for both connectivity and transaction
information (amount, fee, etc.).
We consider both the advanced decision tree model as well
as the logistic regression model for classification, representing
the range of sophisticated and simple methods. To model
the weak attacker, we do not invoke the hyper-parameter
calibration procedure, and use the default parameter settings.
F1 and accuracy scores are reported in Table II. Given that
1-motifs are simpler to compute in practice for an attacker,
we place them before Temporal and Centrality features when
reporting the results.
The results provide two relevant insights. First it is notable
that even a weak attacker using a simple model (logistic
regression) with default hyper-parameter settings, and using
only the 10 simplest features, is able to identify the entity
type with 41% accuracy, i.e. a factor of two improvement as
compared to a random guess over the 5 classes.
Second, it is of significance that while the model choice
does not significantly impact the classification performance,
using more sophisticated features provides drastic improve-
ment. Indeed, the user of 3-motif features, encompassing
the behavior of the 3-hop graph neighborhood of a given
identity, contributes more than 30% relative improvement to
Table II
INCREMENTAL GROUPING OF FEATURES AND ASSOCIATED
PERFORMANCE METRICS.
Features —Features— Alg. Accuracy F1 Precision
Address 10 LR 0.415 0.303 0.351
Entity 18 (+8) LR 0.476 0.369 0.445
1-motif 62 (+44) LR 0.524 0.471 0.474
Temporal 78 (+16) LR 0.512 0.493 0.498
Centrality 120 (+42) LR 0.561 0.545 0.551
2-motif 201 (+81) LR 0.585 0.574 0.573
3-motif 315 (+114) LR 0.841 0.835 0.857
Address 10 LGBM 0.5 0.487 0.492
Entity 18 (+8) LGBM 0.476 0.429 0.415
1-motif 62 (+44) LGBM 0.622 0.597 0.613
Temporal 78 (+16) LGBM 0.659 0.649 0.654
Centrality 120 (+42) LGBM 0.610 0.597 0.603
2-motif 201 (+81) LGBM 0.683 0.654 0.667
3-motif 315 (+114) LGBM 0.890 0.886 0.897
the accuracy score (from 0.68 to 0.89 accuracy for the decision
tree model).
2) Strong attacker: We now consider a strong attacker
collecting the full set of features, and then selecting a small
set of highly significant features. We model this process by
applying the hyper-parameter calibration procedure described
earlier. We then obtain the ranked feature set from the decision
tree model. Table III provides the top ten features of the
decision tree model.
Table III
RANKED FEATURES: BY IMPORTANCE ACCORDING TO THE DECISION
TREE MODEL.
Rank Type Name
1 3-motif unique entity 3 successor
2 Entity prop coinbase
3 2-motif loop 2 std nb inputs
4 2-motif loop 2 mean nb inputs
5 3-motif outgoing 3 mean nb outputs
6 3-motif outgoing 3 std nb outputs
7 3-motif outgoing 3 std fee 1 btc
8 3-motif outgoing 3 mean nb inputs
9 1-motif incoming mean fee usd
10 3-motif loop 3 mean fee 2 btc
The results indicate that the 3-hop graph neighborhood
features dominate. Note, however that there are 114 such 3-
hop graph neighborhood features out of 315 features in total.
It can be seen from Table III that outgoing features are
more relevant that incoming features. This supports a “causal”
interpretation that features specific to an entity can be well
detected from its downstream transaction trace.
We now examine the minimal set of features required to
obtain state-of-the-art accuracy. We present in Figure 7 the F1
and accuracy improvement over the complete feature relevance
ranking from the decision tree algorithm for both the logistic
regression and the decision tree model.
It is clear from the figure that even with a simple logistic
regression model, the 20 most relevant features are sufficient to
obtain high classification accuracy. Using a more sophisticated
Figure 7. Feature Selection using LightGBM
decision tree model allows reducing the number of features to
15, after which improvement plateaus.
D. Overall model performance
Finally, we consider the sophisticated attacker using hyper-
parameter optimization. Table IV presents the Accuracy and
F1 score for both classification methods.
Table IV
OPTIMIZING F1 WITH 315 FEATURES, 50 ITERATIONS OF THE
HYPER-PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE, GLOBAL RESULTS.
Algorithm Accuracy F1 Precision
Logistic Regression 0.85 0.85 0.87
LightGBM 0.92 0.91 0.92
Table V, provides the class-specific overall performance
results.
The results dominate state-of-the-art results from the liter-
ature, which may be due to the use of novel advanced graph
neighborhood features, as evidenced from Table II, along with
the hyper-parameter optimization. At the class level, good
classification accuracy (above 95%) is achieved over the set
of exchanges, gambling services and general services as well
Table V
OPTIMIZING F1 WITH 315 FEATURES, 50 ITERATIONS OF THE
HYPER-PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE, CLASS-LEVEL RESULTS.
Category Algorithm Accuracy F1 Precision
Exchange LR 0.91 0.91 0.91
Gambling LR 0.9 0.82 0.75
Mining LR 0.5 0.67 1.0
Service LR 0.85 0.87 0.89
Darknet LR 0.75 0.75 0.75
Exchange LGBM 0.94 0.92 0.91
Gambling LGBM 0.95 0.97 1.0
Mining LGBM 0.5 0.67 1.0
Service LGBM 0.95 0.88 0.83
Darknet LGBM 1.0 1.0 1.0
as the darknet category. Mining pool behavior is less-well
captured as evidenced by the low accuracy, indicating that
there is no consistent transaction pattern identified for this
class.
V. CONCLUSION
We formulate the problem of analyzing Bitcoin Blockchain
transaction graph anonymity properties as a classification
problem over a set of categories of Bitcoin users. Our results
indicate that it is feasible for a weak attacker to characterize
entities using a set of new graph neighborhood features that
we propose, and that is feasible for a strong attacker to do the
same with as little as 15 of the most relevant features.
This suggests a number of interesting avenues for further
work. Since it is possible as we have shown to accurately
classify transacting entities on the Bitcoin Blockchain, the
question arises as to whether it is possible to develop an
effective generative model of the transaction network. If so, it
would enable a wealth of studies into the effect of changes in
network protocols or regulatory frameworks on the evolution
of the Bitcoin economy.
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